This study examines the structural relationships between local revenue capacity, intergovernmental coordination, interjurisdictional competition, and regional asymmetry within decentralized governance systems. A unidirectional model is proposed and empirically tested using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM). Data were collected through a structured questionnaire with reflective indicators, and the measurement model was assessed in terms of reliability and validity, confirming adequate levels of composite reliability and convergent validity. The structural model results reveal that local revenue capacity significantly influences intergovernmental coordination, which in turn positively affects interjurisdictional competition. Furthermore, interjurisdictional competition exerts a strong effect on regional asymmetry, highlighting the role of competitive dynamics in shaping territorial disparities. The model demonstrates moderate explanatory power and satisfactory fit indices, supporting its predictive relevance. The findings contribute to the understanding of multilevel fiscal interactions and suggest that while decentralization can enhance efficiency, it may also reinforce regional inequalities if not accompanied by appropriate coordination and equalization mechanisms.